Enthusiasm, Interest, and Youth Club Activities After Stalin

At the 1956 Twentieth Communist Party Congress, A. N. Shelepin, the First Secretary of the Komsomol, the mass Soviet youth organization, criticized the Komsomol for being "slow to add new and interesting content to work with Komsomol members," which "naturally, cannot satisfy young people." He likewise called for "developing initiative and grassroots activism."[i] My presentation explores these new post-Stalin notes in official cultural policy through the lens of novel youth-oriented cultural collectives known as interest-based clubs (*kluby po interesu*).[ii]

My data shows that enthusiasm emerged as a key public emotion in the mid-1950s, the early years of the "Thaw," the term for the decade and a half following Stalin's death in 1953.[iii] My findings contribute to the budding historiography on emotions in Soviet history.[iv] Likewise, I posit that the post-Stalin tropes in official discourse regarding the soliciting of initiative from below represent the revival, in a new form, of the debates within the Party from the pre-revolutionary years on spontaneity versus consciousness. This theme refers to the widespread disagreements over whether to rely on a populist approach to constructing communism that appealed to and gradually built up support among the masses for a moderate and evolutionary path, or a more coercive, top-down strategy of leadership by an ideologically conscious vanguard that pursued a more radical and revolutionary course. The literature on this subject has focused on the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet years, virtually ignoring what I argue was a shift from the extreme emphasis on consciousness under Stalin to a more balanced position afterward.[v]

This balance, I suggest, comes through clearly in the interest-based clubs. On one hand, instead of simply dictating from above what young people should be interested in as did the Stalin authorities, post-Stalin official discourse pivoted toward proclaiming the need to fit and appeal to really-existing youth interests and wants. On the other hand, the Khrushchev

authorities still aimed to use interest-based clubs as a means of directing and thus reshaping the interests of young people. Through doing so, the Kremlin strove to reforge youth identities, their senses of self, into those of New Soviet People, model subjects ready to build communism.[vi]

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In the mid-1950s, the Komsomol Central Committee proposed creating a wide variety of innovative cultural collectives managed by young people, most notably youth clubs.[vii] Youth clubs harked back to NEP-era Komsomol-managed clubs. They formed part of a broader Thaw-era search for a "Leninist" path to communism that sought to avoid Stalinist stains.[viii]

A crucial difference between interest-based clubs and the Stalin-era hobby circles stemmed from the stress on youth activism and initiative in the interest-based clubs. An adult leader organized and directed a circle's activities. Circles also had a patently didactic purpose, often featuring a program of instruction. They functioned only as part of a bigger cultural establishment, with no independent organizational status or budget. In contrast, young interest-based club members themselves took charge of the club's organization and governance, though within the limits defined by oversight institutions. Likewise, the interest-based clubs had less educational elements, placing more emphasis on uniting rather than teaching participants. Additionally, interest-based clubs had an autonomous budget and status, not being dependent on any given cultural establishment. They could affiliate with any institution willing to give them a space to meet. An interview with B. G. Pshenichner, an official in Moscow's Pioneer Palace who worked with circles and interest-based clubs dedicate to astronomy and aeronautics from the Thaw era on, further illuminates the differences. When I asked him to compare circles and clubs, he stated that clubs had an element of self-management, more autonomy, and less bureaucracy.[ix]

The Komsomol leadership expressed broad encouragement for these clubs. For instance, the Komsomol Central Committee in 1956 advocated for the widespread creation of "clubs for stamp collecting, photography, radios, and clubs of young women and older school children" as a means of dealing with the continuing Stalin-era problems in Komsomol work.[x] With such support, interest-based clubs spread throughout the Soviet Union in the mid- and late 1950s. In 1967, 12,000 youth clubs, which included interest-based clubs, functioned in the USSR.[xi] Youth clubs had anywhere from several dozen to several hundred members, and thus total membership in 1967 likely ranged from half a million to a million youth. Thus, from the Thaw onward, many millions among the young participated in such cultural collectives.

Interest-based clubs targeted a much wider range of activities than Stalin-era hobby circles. Exemplifying the variety of such clubs, the Komsomol's plan to construct a Youth Palace in Moscow included many rooms for clubs dedicated to specific interests: photography, movies, radio, music, tourism, fishing and hunting, keeping pigeons, collecting stamps, cars, technology, aeronautics, gardening, and an international club.[xii] In Kemerovo chess, tourist, and photography clubs expanded the range of cultural activities for youth. These clubs also contributed to the varied duties of the Komsomol. The photography clubs created photo displays and produced satirical newspapers. All created using voluntary initiative, such production decreased financial outlays.[xiii] L'viv had a "Club for Artistic Youth," and Dniepropetrovsk a "Club for Creative Youth."[xiv] Nature protection clubs began to appear.[xv] International clubs emerged.[xvi]

Satisfying youth desires and appealing to their interests served as a primary goal of these clubs for the authorities. Increasing the amount of time that youth spent in officially-monitored contexts constituted another key aim. So did developing youth activism and community leadership. Besides these overarching benefits, the hierarchy perceived specific interest-based

clubs as providing a wide variety of additional benefits. For instance, the authorities intended aeronautics, automobile, technology and similar clubs to promote youth knowledge about and interest in a needed profession; nature, hunting, and fishing clubs endeavored to advance military preparation and fitness; music and film clubs sought to spread normative cultural standards; photography clubs contributed to propaganda; international clubs increased knowledge about the world and promoted international ties, improving the Soviet image abroad in the Cold War.

Interest-based clubs aimed at various social demographics also emerged, and marked an even bigger break from the Stalin years by bringing together youth to enjoy the company of others who presumably shared similar interests, with no direct Stalinist equivalents. The plan for Moscow's Youth Palace included clubs for college students, young women, and older school students (*starsheklassniki*), those in seventh through tenth grades aged approximately fourteen to seventeen.[xvii]

(Figure 1)

The latter received particular support in a Komsomol Central Committee 1956 resolution that highlighted the need to create clubs for older school students to hold "evenings of song, dancing, movie festivals, various debates, meetings with scientists, writers, and artists, exemplary workers, sport activities, and other events." It underscored that "the students themselves need to bear responsibility for the organizational work in the club," with supervision from official Party-state bodies and involvement by parents, teachers, cultural officials, college students, and others.[xviii] These clubs for older school students thus combined grassroots community leadership,

satisfaction of youth interests, spreading cultural enlightenment, and instilling health and fitness with getting school-age youngsters into collective spaces.

Clubs for young women also sprang up. A 1956 front-page article in the national Komsomol organ both commended the successful start-up of a club for young women in a Minsk factory and, since it appeared so prominently, served as one of many signals from above to spread such establishments across the board.

(Figure 2)

This club created sections devoted to dancing, photography, sewing and crocheting, and folk musical instruments. It planned to organize events with the titles "How to Dress Simply and Well" and "Evening for Young Mothers." The club's activities also uplifted high-performing young women workers. The journalist highlighted in particular how such clubs helped young women who got married stay involved in collective activities, and also made clear that young women themselves took charge over such clubs.[xix] Thus, in addition to the overarching benefits of interest-based clubs, clubs for young women had the addiotional benefit of keeping young married women involved in organized cultural recreation after marriage, also teaching them appropriate fashion norms and the child-rearing and home-keeping skills seen as necessary for young women.

These clubs bring out the nuanced gender implications of young women's lives in the Thaw. The historiography has highlighted how the Khrushchev leadership reopened the "woman question" by publicly acknowledging and endeavoring to assist women with the "double burden" of working outside the home and undertaking domestic and childrearing chores. The Khrushchev

administration did so by supporting collective social services, such as crèches, and also calling on men to do more to help and express respect for women, with some limited success.[xx] I suggest that the official discourse on organized recreation suggests that young married women in particular bore a "triple burden." The post-Stalin rhetoric called upon them not only to work hard and to keep the house and raise children, but also to engage in community activism through collective cultural activities – these three elements defined the model gender roles of New Soviet Young Women in the Thaw. Clubs for young women both encouraged women to take on all aspects of these gender roles, and supported women in carrying them out.

Brief Introduction of Other Interest-Based Cultural Activities and Video Clip

Interest-based clubs shine a light on the enactment of the new and more loose Thaw-era emotional regime at the ground level of youth cultural life. William Reddy used the term "emotional regime" to refer to the emotional norms of expression and experience propounded by those in charge at any given time. He envisioned emotional regimes on a spectrum from loose to strict, with the latter referring to ones with tightly bounded and closely managed affective norms, whose violation drew harsh disciplining.[xxi] State-sponsored popular culture[xxii] reoriented drastically after 1953 to appeal much more to the reality of youth interests and solicit initiative from below, all with an eye toward inspiring grassroots enthusiasm for the Soviet project.[xxiii]

I propose that the widespread youth engagement in interest-based clubs indicates significant success on the part of the authorities in placing enthusiasm at the heart of the Soviet emotional community in the Thaw. Confirming this trend, other areas of organized cultural

recreation also experienced rapid growth in the Thaw.[xxiv] Furthermore, other scholarship also points to the explosive growth of enthusiasm and optimism in many areas of Soviet society.[xxv]

Certainly, far from all Soviet youth chose to dedicate extensive time and energy to interest-based clubs and other forms of organized cultural recreation. Some preferred to spend their time and express their passions in other settings, including non-state ones.[xxvi] Furthermore, the Khrushchev authorities did not endorse the full range of actually-existing youth interests. Instead, the top officials chose only those perceived as having some potential benefits.

Likewise, in some cases interest-based clubs had the potential to hold activities that did not conform fully with top-level intentions. For instance, certain clubs devoted to collecting stamps and coins hosted illegal trade in these valuable objects between members.[xxvii] Some international clubs received official criticism for inadequate monitoring of contacts with outsiders.[xxviii] L. V. Guseva, a librarian at Saratov State University who ran a science fiction club, told me that the club occasionally discussed some pieces distributed in self-published (*samizdat*) form that failed to go through official censorship.[xxix] Only rarely did the authorities actually close clubs, usually when these explicitly challenged the boundaries. For instance, the authorities banned a club for poets after it staged an exhibit of abstract art.[xxx] Dniepropetrovsk's "Club for Creative Youth" was shut due to suspicions that the club promoted Ukrainian nationalism.[xxxi]

Owing to the top-level emphasis on satisfying youth interests and inspiring initiative from below, some degree of unsanctioned activities was inevitable in the interest-based club movement. However, most instances of nonconformism, at least those that did not lead to the exceedingly rare closures of clubs, in part contributed to the stability and legitimacy of the Party-state. The authorities succeeded in getting young people to spend their time within official

settings and satisfied youth desires to express opinions and undertake activities at some variance from prescribed ones. If youngsters lacked such officially-sanctioned outlets, their nonconformism could potentially have expressed itself in a much more destabilizing fashion and resulting in significant alienation from the Soviet system.

Overall, the multitude of Soviet youth whose interests and passions fit within the much-expanded and genuine grassroots orientation of post-Stalin policy experienced a substantial improvement in their everyday cultural life. The new approach worked well for bringing the official emotional regime closer to young people's actual emotions, getting many youth who were excluded and alienated under Stalin into the overarching Soviet emotional community. This is a term deployed by Barbara Rosenwein to refer to a group whose members follow shared norms of emotional expression and possess the same affective outlooks.[xxxii] Cynicism and disillusionment arguably decreased while enthusiasm and joy grew, improving youth lives overall.[xxxiii] It thus seems reasonable to postulate that the gap between young people and the authorities that grew wide in the late Stalin years shrunk significantly in the early Thaw.[xxxiv]

No wonder, then, that many young people chose enthusiastically to go along with the official post-Stalin guidelines regarding state-sponsored popular culture. These youth exhibited what I term "conformist agency," namely the conscious and willing decision, stemming primarily from one's internal motivations as opposed to external pressure, to act in ways that follow official guidelines closely.[xxxv] Such conclusions add to the scholarship on post-Stalin youth and popular culture, which has cast much-needed light on the small numbers of youth involved in public countercultural activities, but has not paid sufficient attention to the brunt of youth who did not engage in public nonconformism, leaving their lives in the shadows.[xxxvi]

At the same time, the Party-state cultural policy aimed to co-opt youth interests to achieve officially-prescribed goals. My interviews with Pschenichner and N. V. Kozlova, who also worked with him in Moscow's Pioneer Palace, reveal this well. Kozlova related that the activities in the Palace aimed to utilize a young person's enthusiasm for space both for education and for moral upbringing (*vospitanie*): in her own words, "to use his interest in this field to influence him."[xxxvii] Pshenichner, in parallel to Kozlova, underlined the functionality of interest-based clubs to "direct the activism of young people into appropriate channels."[xxxviii] Similar goals and outcomes characterized a broad range of interest-based clubs at the Pioneer Palace.[xxxix]

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The tensions between spontaneity and consciousness dating back to the pre-revolutionary years continued to impact Soviet society throughout the history of the USSR. The late Stalinist administration adopted a radically consciousness-oriented approach in its youth policy, demanding strict discipline from young people and making disingenuous Socialist Realist claims that the interests and preferences of Soviet youth matched its idealized model of ideological militancy, orientation toward production, and xenophobic nationalism.[xl] The Khrushchev leadership moved away from that position and toward a more balanced approach closer to the spontaneity end of the spectrum by seeking to inspire youth grassroots initiative and appeal to young people's interests. The post-Stalin leadership's change in course served to move enthusiasm to the heart of the Thaw-era emotional regime. The overarching goal of the new administration consisted of getting the population engaged in the Khrushchev-era revival of the campaign to progress toward communism through further transforming society. Having young people experience a strong emotional affinity – enthusiasm – for this aim constituted an important element of the broader drive. Less overtly, the Khrushchev leadership also hoped to

secure greater legitimacy for itself through fulfilling popular youth desires.

In comparison to the late Stalin years, substantially more youngsters showed conformist agency by participating enthusiastically in state-sponsored popular culture during the Thaw. Plenty also welcomed the new opportunity to take on significant community leadership roles within the cultural sphere. Such youth activism attests to the achievements of the Khrushchev authorities in sparking grassroots enthusiasm for organized cultural recreation. The post-Stalin liberalizing policies transformed not only the emotional regime, but also the reality of the Soviet emotional community, making enthusiasm for building communism a part of everyday life for many, who saw this process as in accordance with their own personal interests and aspirations.

While my conclusions underscore the significant degree of cooperation and mutual benefits between the governing structures and mainstream youth resulting from the Khrushchev administration's shift in its youth cultural policy toward spontaneity, the cultural authorities certainly maintained distinct elements of consciousness in their approach to socially engineering Soviet society. Officials strove not only to appeal to and satisfy young people, but also to guide their interests and eagerness for community involvement into channels perceived as conducive to building a communist society and reforging youth identities into those of the Thaw-era version of New Soviet People. Interest-based clubs and other forms of state-sponsored popular culture functioned to occupy youth leisure time with prescribed collective activities, as well as fulfilling a variety of pragmatic functions such as professional preparation, cultural enlightenment, ensuring military readiness and fitness, and decreasing financial burdens on the Party-state.

The Soviet reforms bore similarities to other socialist states. For instance, already in 1948, after Josip Tito broke with Stalin, the Yugoslavian Party-state began to promote initiative from below and the need to appeal to actual youth interests, further supporting the importance of

de-Stalinization in bringing about these developments. This similarity likewise illustrates that the tension between the values of consciousness and spontaneity had widescale relevance across the broader socialist sphere.[xli] Other socialist states, such as East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary, promoted grassroots initiative and appeasing authentic youth cultural interests following Stalin's demise, frequently following changes in the hard-line leaderships backed by Stalin.[xlii] On the one hand, these parallels highlight the importance of the top officials changing their approach to the cultural sphere in shaping youth everyday cultural life. On the other hand, the authorities in each case aimed to fit genuinely popular interests and desires, illustrating that the change in course actually followed from and responded to the citizenry and its needs and preferences. In effect, the socialist governing authorities after Stalin negotiated with the population to create a more pluralistic mass cultural system. This system both enabled ruling bodies to achieve their goals through socially engineering the populations while also accommodating to the population's real desires and interests and convincing the citizenry that they can have a personally meaningful and enjoyable lifestyle and experience of socialism. Despite the multitude of other problems within socialist states, the post-Stalin transformations in Soviet and eastern European state-sponsored popular cultures helped ensure the long-term stability of these systems.

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[i] *XX s''ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet. Ch. 1* (Moscow, 1956), 603, 606-08.

[ii] It relies on evidence from archival materials, official publications, and interviews with cultural and Komsomol officials who organized such activities, with a particular emphasis on urban settings in Soviet Russia.

[iii] Some scholars have rightly questioned the equation of the Thaw era and the term "Thaw" itself with unvarnished liberalism, but I continue to use this name as best conveying the series of thaws and chills in this ambiguous and multivalent, but overall more pluralistic, tolerant, and grassroots-oriented era. For more on this term, see Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2008), 1-13; Nancy Condee, "Uncles, Deviance, and Ritual Combat: The Cultural Codes of Khrushchev's Thaw," in William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason eds., *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 160-76.

[iv] For some diverse takes on emotions in Russian history, see the essays in Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol eds., *Interpreting Emotions in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011); Jan Plamper, Schamma Schahadat, and Marc Elie eds., *Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010).

[v] On spontaneity versus consciousness, see Anna Krylova, "Beyond the Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: 'Class Instinct' as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis," *Slavic Review*, 62.1 (Spring 2003): 1-23; Leopold Haimson, "Lenin's Revolutionary Career Revisited: Some Observations on Recent Discussions," *Kritika*, 5.1 (Winter 2004): 55-80; David L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 303-13.

[vi] For New Soviet People, see Igal Halfin, *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 205-82; Peter Fritzsche and Jochen Hellbeck, "The New Man in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany," in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 302-44.

[vii] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 14; *XX s''ezd KPSS*, 607-08.

[viii] On this turn in the mid-1930s, see Lynn Mally, *Revolutionary Acts: Amateur Theater and the Soviet State, 1917-1938* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 146-212; Malte Rolfe, *Sovetskie massovye prazdniki* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 96-97; Susannah L. Smith, "From Peasants to Professionals: The Socialist-Realist Transformation of a Russian Folk Choir," *Kritika* 3.3 (Summer 2002): 393-425.

[ix] B. G. Pshenichner, born 1933, interviewed April 29, 2009. For more on this circle, see E. V. Bashlii, *Zvezdnyi dom na Vorob'evykh gorakh. K 40-letiiu otdela astronomii i kosmanavtiki posviashchaetsia* (Moscow: MGDD(Iu)T, 2002), 1-2. On the Pioneer Palace, see Susan E. Reid, *Khrushchev in Wonderland: The Pioneer Palace in Moscow's Lenin Hills, 1962*, in the series, *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 1606 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 1-53. On early forms of Soviet aeronautics circles, see Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Red Rockets' Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 114-54. For an in-depth study of how an archeological circle functioned in the late Soviet period, see B. S. Gladarev, "Formirovanie i funktsionirovanie milieu (na primere arkheologicheskogo kruzhka LDPDTIu 1970-2000 gg.)," <http://www.indepsocres.spb.ru/boriss.htm> [Accessed October 22, 2012].

[x] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 14.

xi RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 141, l. 95.

[xii] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 133.

[xiii] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 838, l. 120.

[xiv] William J. Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 187-204; Sergei Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) , 31-52.

[xv] Douglas R. Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 312-39.

[xvi] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, l. 133.

[xvii] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 133.

[xviii] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 901, l. 168.

[xix] "Klub devushek," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, September 5, 1956.

[xx] See the contributors to Ilič, Reid and Attwood eds., *Women in the Khrushchev Era*.

[xxi] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 124-29; William M. Reddy, "Comment: Emotional Turn? Feelings in Russian History and Culture" *Slavic Review* 68.2 (Summer 2009): 329-34.

[xxii] This essay uses "state-sponsored popular culture" as a loose translation of *kul'turno-massovaia rabota*, literally cultural-mass work, which official discourse used to refer to the wide variety of state-organized cultural recreation activities for the masses, mostly youth. These spanned celebrations, cultural enlightenment events, and amateur artistic activities that included music, theater, dance, and similar activities. State-sponsored popular culture mostly took place in government-run mass-oriented cultural institutions that bore the generic name *kluby*, clubs, which ranged from grand Palaces and Houses of Culture, to smaller establishments simply termed clubs, down to separate rooms in factories and enterprises dedicated to culture, enlightenment, and propaganda known as red corners. Educational institutions, libraries, and parks also hosted state-sponsored popular culture.

[xxiii] My findings indicate the need to nuance the recent claim that from the postwar Stalin years onward, "despite short flames of new enthusiasm," Soviet youth were characterized by "shirking the system." See Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, 19.

[xxiv] For instance, in 1950 amateur arts circles had about 4,000,000 performers, and by 1954 about 5,000,000. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 102; A. N. Shelepin, *Otchetnyi doklad TsK VLKSM XII s''ezdu komsomola* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1954), 46. However, by 1962 about 9,000,000 performed in amateur arts collectives, showing how these grew much more rapidly after Stalin's demise. S. P. Pavlov, *Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii XXII s''ezda KPSS* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 51.

[xxv] Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008), 1-18; Miriam Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 154-56; Robert Hornsby, *Citizens against the State: Political Dissent and Repression in Khrushchev's USSR* (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2013), Introduction; S. K. Kovaleva ed., *Ty pomnish', fizfak? Neformal'nye traditsii fizfaka MGU* (Moscow: Pomatur, 2003); Emily Lygo, *Leningrad Poetry, 1953-1975: The Thaw Generation* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 51-57; William J. Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 179-219.

[xxvi] Juliane Fürst, "Friends in Private, Friends in Public: The Phenomena of Kompaniia Among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s," in Lewis H. Siegelbaum ed., *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 229-50; Benjamin K. Tromly, "Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948-1964" (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2007), 155-56.

[xxvii] *Russkii Zhurnal*, August 16, 1998. "Marochki: Interv'iu Aleksandra Levina s Andreem Sergeevym."

[xxviii] Thus, one Komsomol report condemned the fact that letters to foreigners occasionally included "exchanges of souvenirs and descriptions of the ostentatious lifestyles in capitalist countries, which creates false impression of the West." RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, l. 133.

[xxix] This included a piece by one of the most prominent Soviet science fiction authors, A. N. Strugatskii, who visited the club and circulated his unpublishable piece to the club's members. The club, and Guseva herself, ran into serious trouble once over such practices, but survived without serious negative consequences. L. V. Guseva, born 1935, interviewed June 1, 2009.

[xxx] L. V. Polikovskaia, *My predchustviie... predtecha... ploshchad' Maiakovskogo, 1958-1965* (Moscow: Zvenia, 1997), 143-52. On the official stance against abstract art, see Susan E. Reid, "In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited," *Kritika* 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673-716.

[xxxi] Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City* , 31-52.

[xxxii] Rosenwein writes that any society has an overarching emotional community and subordinate emotional communities, which engage with but elaborate upon and occasionally contradict the affective values of the primary emotional community. Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2.

[xxxiii] On the benefits of such positive feelings, see the contributors to Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis, and Berry Keverne eds., *The Science of Well-Being* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); C. R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez eds., *Handbook of Positive Psychology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002).

[xxxiv] On this gap, see Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, 1-21.

[xxxv] For more on conformist agency, see Gleb Tsipursky, "Conformism and Agency: Model Young Communists and the Komsomol Press in the Later Khrushchev Years, 1961-1964," *Europe-Asia Studies* (forthcoming in 2014). More broadly, the term "agency" refers to behavior primarily motivated by an individual's personal interests and wants, as opposed to conduct imposed forcefully by external structures. My definition of agency draws on Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5-11; Ken Roberts, *Youth in Transition: Eastern Europe and the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 14; Birgitte Søland, *Becoming Modern: Young Women and the Reconstruction of Womanhood in the 1920s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-18.

[xxxvi] Some examples include William J. Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 179-250; Sergei Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 65-106; Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 220-22; Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 158-206.

[xxxvii] N. V. Kozlova, born 1933, interviewed April 29, 2009.
[xxxviii] B. G. Pshenichner, born 1933, interviewed April 29, 2009.
[xxxix] According to V. S. Miagkova, who worked with a wide variety of such youth clubs and praised them as "a ticket into life for very many." V. S. Miagkova, born 1923, interviewed April 29, 2009.
[xl]Socialist Realism is canonical style in arts and culture that presented the officially-prescribed model as the true reality. On Socialist Realism, see Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 54-105; Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3-24.
[xli] Sabina Mihelj, "Negotiating Cold War Culture at the Crossroads of East and West: Uplifting the Working People, Entertaining the Masses, Cultivating the Nation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 53.2 (June 2011): 509-39.
[xlii] On East Germany, see Thomas Lindenberger, "The Fragmented Society: 'Social Activism' and Authority in the GDR State Socialism," *Zeitgeschichte*, 37.1 (January-February 2010): 3-20; Esther von Richthofen, *Bringing Culture to the Masses, Control, Compromise and Participation in the GDR* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 28-47. On Bulgaria, see Taylor, *Let's Twist Again*, 122. On Hungary, see Karl Brown, "Dance Hall Days: Jazz and Hooliganism in Communist Hungary, 1948-1956," in Gertrud Pickhan and Rudiger Ritter eds., *Jazz behind the Iron Curtain* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 267-94.